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IV. Proving Facts: Belief versus Probability
Richard W. Wright
A. PROVING FACTS IN THE COMMON LAW AND THE 
CIVIL LAW: RADICALLY DIFFERENT STANDARDS 
OF PERSUASION?
Although it comes as a great surprise to most American lawyers and legal 
scholars, it is commonly assumed by those familiar with civil (non-criminal) 
trial procedures in both common law and civil law jurisdictions that there is a 
radical difference between the standards of proof in the two types of jurisdic-
tions.1 Yet, despite the assumed difference and the great practical as well as 
theoretical significance of the topic, not much is said about the burden of proof 
in monographs on comparative tort law, and what little is said tends to focus on 
the allocation of the burden rather than on its content.2
The general rule in both types of jurisdictions is that the plaintiff bears the burden 
of proving the prima facie case against the defendant (the defendant’s tortious 
causation of the harm allegedly suffered by the plaintiff), while the defendant 
bears the burden of proving any affirmative defenses.3 However, the burden is 
sometimes shifted to the defendant on one or more elements of the prima facie 
case. This occurs much more often in civil law jurisdictions, through presumptions 
or explicit reversals of the burden of proof, than in common law jurisdictions.4 
1 E.g., K.M. Clermont/E. Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, American Journal 
of Comparative Law (AJCL) 50 (2002) 243 ff.; C. Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence versus 
Intime Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental 
European Law, Vermont Law Review (Vermont L Rev) 33 (2009) 435 ff.; J. Kokott, The Burden 
of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law (1998) 18.
2 E.g., C. van Dam, European Tort Law (2006) 281 ff.; W. van Gerven/J. Lever/P. Larouche, 
Case, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law (2000) sec. 4.2.3 
(available at http://www.casebooks.eu/tort/chapter4.php) accessed on 16 July 2009.
3 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 248; M. Kazazi, Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A 
Study on Evidence Before International Tribunals (1995) 57 ff. 
4 P.L. Murray/R. Stürner, German Civil Justice (2004) 267 ff.; van Dam (fn. 2) 281 ff.; van 
Gerven/Lever/Larouche (fn. 2) sec. 4.2.3; European Commission, European Judicial Network 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Taking of evidence and mode of proof (available at http://
ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/evidence/evidence_gen_en.htm) accessed 30 June 2009; short form: 
EC EJN Evidence and Proof.
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Among the various possible explanations for this difference, two are based on 
real or assumed differences between the two types of jurisdictions with respect 
to the two aspects of the burden of proof.
The first aspect is the burden of producing evidence. It is generally much more 
difficult for plaintiffs in civil law jurisdictions to obtain relevant evidence, 
which often is in the hands of or more readily available to the defendant. The 
parties in civil law jurisdictions do not have the extensive (perhaps too exten-
sive) “discovery” procedures available in common law jurisdictions – espe-
cially in the United States – to compel production of evidence, nor do judges 
in civil law jurisdictions generally have such power, except in France, where 
the power is seldom used.5
The second aspect is the burden of persuasion, including the standard of per-
suasion, which is the focus of this essay. In common law jurisdictions, there is 
a clear and explicit distinction between the standard of persuasion in criminal 
and civil proceedings. In criminal proceedings, the standard is very high: the 
prosecutor must prove the defendant’s guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt”. In 
civil proceedings, however, the plaintiff generally only needs to prove his 
case by the much lower standard of a “preponderance of the evidence” (the 
usual formulation in the United States) or a “balance of probability” (the usual 
formulation in the United Kingdom, the British Commonwealth and Scandi-
navia). Both the preponderance standard, which is often rephrased or inter-
preted as a “more likely than not” standard, and the “balance of probabilities” 
standard are commonly interpreted as merely requiring a 50+ percent proba-
bility.6
In most civil law jurisdictions, on the other hand, there is a common, but not 
universal, assumption that the standard of persuasion is the same for civil and 
criminal proceedings. The plaintiff in a civil case, as well as the prosecutor in a 
criminal case, must provide sufficient proof to convince the trier of fact of the 
truth of the facts at issue on the particular occasion. This is phrased in France 
and elsewhere as a requirement that the trier of fact have an “intime convic-
tion,” an inner, personal, subjective conviction or belief in the truth of the facts 
at issue. It is often stated that the required conviction can only be established 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or proof that “silences doubts without 
completely excluding them.” Although it is recognized that absolute certainty 
is impossible to achieve, the required degree of belief is often expressed in 
terms of a virtual certainty, or at least a very high probability. However, a mere 
5 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 248, 265 f.; M. Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 
AJCL 51 (2003) 659 ff., 675.
6 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 243, 251 f. and fn. 39, 257, 261 fn. 86; Kokott (fn. 1) 18 f. 
Sometimes an intermediate standard is used, according to which the plaintiff must prove her case 
by “clear and convincing evidence.” Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 251; Kokott (fn. 1) 19 
f. The interpretation of the preponderance of the evidence standard as a mere 50+ percent prob-
ability standard is literally implemented by Kokott, who refers to the preponderance standard as 
a “preponderance of probabilities.” Kokott (fn. 1) 20.
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probability, no matter how high, will not suffice in the absence of the required 
conviction or belief in the truth of the facts at issue.7
Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, explicitly or through rebuttable 
presumptions, compensates for the lack of discovery procedures and the as-
sumed very high standard of persuasion in civil law jurisdictions. However, 
given the assumed very high standard of persuasion that is thereby placed on 
the defendant, the shift of the burden of proof overcompensates and, perhaps 
intentionally, effectively converts civil code provisions basing liability on fault 
into strict liability regimes.
Common law lawyers find it hard to understand why the very high standard 
of persuasion required for a criminal conviction should also apply in a civil 
liability action.8 Some of them also believe that the civil law’s rejection of 
proof by statistical probabilities and its insistence that the trier of fact instead 
be convinced of the truth of the facts at issue is naïve, irrational, “strange” and 
“very odd,” especially when such conviction is interpreted as requiring virtual 
certainty. They note that nothing is certain, that all evidence merely gives rise 
to probabilities regarding the facts at issue, and that the 50+ percent probability 
standard best serves the assumed goal of minimizing errors.9 They also ques-
tion the focus on conviction, belief, and truth in civil law jurisdictions given 
the very limited means for acquiring relevant evidence in those jurisdictions.10
Conversely, many civil law lawyers believe that it is naïve to believe that mere 
statistical probabilities can establish what actually happened in a particular 
case, and they find it hard to understand why a defendant should be held civilly 
liable based merely on such aggregate class-based probabilities, in the absence 
of evidence sufficient to convince the trier of fact of what actually happened 
in the particular case. Believing that the common law’s “preponderance of the 
evidence” and “balance of probability” standards allow such proof, they reject 
both standards, at least as so interpreted.11
I argue in this essay that the supposed radical difference between the standard 
of persuasion in civil cases in common law and civil law jurisdictions is greatly 
overstated. In both types of jurisdiction, the plaintiff generally must provide 
evidence sufficient to convince the trier of fact of the truth of the facts at issue 
in the particular situation; a mere statistical probability, no matter how high, 
is insufficient. On the other hand, in both types of jurisdictions the required 
degree of conviction by the trier of fact is far below a virtual certainty.
7 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 243 ff., 254 ff.; EC EJN Evidence and Proof (fn. 4); Kokott 
(fn. 1) 18 f.; F.H.S. Bridge, The Council of Europe French-English Legal Dictionary (2002) 
173 (defining “intime conviction” as “reasonable conviction; reasonable certainty; state of be-
ing satisfied beyond reasonable doubt (personally convinced); personal conviction of the court 
(after considering all the evidence)”).
8 E.g. Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 243 ff.; Engel, Vermont L Rev (2009) 345 ff.
9 E.g. Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 243 f., 251 f., 258 f., 267, 271, 273 f.
10 Id. 249 f.
11 E.g. Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 659, 663 f., 667 ff.
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The seeming conflict between the civil law’s focus on conviction or belief and 
the common law’s focus on likelihood or probability is based on a failure of 
those on each side of the conflict to appreciate that, while it is true that all proof 
involves probabilities, there are different types of probabilities, only one of 
which – which is not statistical in nature – is sufficient to justify a belief about 
what actually happened on a particular occasion. The failure to appreciate this 
fact has prevented academics and courts in both types of jurisdictions from 
clearly perceiving the relevant issues and has led to troublesome doctrines with 
paradoxical implications in an increasing number of situations.
In Parts B and C of this essay, I discuss, respectively, the standards of persua-
sion in civil law jurisdictions and the standards of persuasion in common law 
jurisdictions. In Part D I discuss the various types of probabilities and their 
relevance in proving the facts at issue in a particular case. In Part E I discuss 
some doctrinal problems and paradoxes that are created by the statistical prob-
ability interpretation of the standard of persuasion.
B. THE STANDARDS OF PERSUASION IN THE CIVIL 
LAW
Michele Taruffo argues persuasively that the common conception of the stan-
dard of persuasion in civil law jurisdictions is incorrect.12 As he states, “no 
rule, in any civil law system, requires the courts to apply in civil cases the same 
standard of proof that is applied in criminal cases.”13
One might argue for such an equation based on the similarity of the relevant 
provisions in the German codes of criminal and civil procedure. Sec. 261 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure states:
The court shall decide on the result of the evidence taken according to its 
free conviction gained from the hearing as a whole.14
Subsec. 1 of sec. 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure states:
The court shall decide at its free discretion, by taking into account the 
whole substance of the proceedings and the results of any evidence tak-
ing, whether a factual allegation should be regarded as true or untrue. 
The grounds which prompted the court’s conviction shall be stated in the 
judgment.15
12 Id. 659 ff.
13 Id. 665.
14 C.J.M. Safferling, Terror and Law – Is the German Legal System able to deal with Terrorism? 
– The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) decision in the case against El Motassadeq, 
German Law Journal 5 (2004) 515, 520.
15 S.L. Goren, The Code of Civil Procedure Rules of the Federal Republic of Germany of January 
30, 1877 and the Introductory Act for the Code of Civil Procedure Rules of January 30, 1877 
(1990) at 73.
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However, while both provisions state the need for the judge to be convinced re-
garding the truth of the fact(s) at issue, neither provides any standard for reach-
ing that conviction or requires that whatever standard is employed be the same 
in criminal and civil proceedings. To the contrary, each emphasizes the judge’s 
discretion in reaching that conviction based on his or her “free evaluation” of 
all the available evidence, unconstrained by rigid rules of legal proof, such as 
the hearsay rules in the common law and the weighting of different types of 
evidence and mathematical calculation of “full proof” that existed under the 
French regime of “preuve légale” prior to the adoption of the civil codes.16
The same point holds for the “intime conviction” standard that is commonly 
said to apply in French criminal and civil proceedings. There is no mention of 
this standard (or any other standard) in the French Civil Code or the Code of 
Civil Procedure.17 It is mentioned in the French Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Art. 304 requires each juror of the Assize Court to swear “to remember that the 
accused is presumed innocent and that he has the benefit of the doubt; to decide 
according to the charges and defence arguments following your conscience 
and your innermost conviction,”18 and art. 353 requires the following instruc-
tion to be read to the jury and “put up in large type in the most visible part of 
the deliberation chamber” before the jury retires for deliberation:
The law does not ask the judges [jurors] to account for the means by which 
they convinced themselves; it does not charge them with any rule from 
which they shall specifically derive the fullness and adequacy of evidence. 
It requires them to question themselves in silence and reflection and to seek 
in the sincerity of their conscience what impression has been made on their 
reason by the evidence brought against the accused and the arguments of 
his defence. The law asks them but this single question, which encloses the 
full scope of their duties: are you inwardly convinced?19
Although phrased in a more explicit subjective manner (but consider the refer-
ence to the judge’s “free discretion” in sec. 286 of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure), the “intime conviction” standard had the same genesis and aim as 
the relevant provisions in the German codes: a replacement of the prior rigid 
rules of legal proof with the “free evaluation” of all the relevant evidence by 
the judge, who is to decide cases according to her own inner, personal, subjec-
tive, “intimate” conviction.20 As Taruffo states,
16 Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 666 f.; see Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 244 f. The judge’s 
“free evaluation” is not completely unconstrained. In addition to the substantial limitations on 
the power of the parties or the judge to obtaining access to relevant evidence, some legal proof 
rules continue to exist, especially in France. See Clermont/Sherwin AJCL 50 (2002) 249; R. 
Vouin, The Exclusionary Rule: France, Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Sci-
ence (JCLCPS) 52 (1961) 275 ff. But cf. Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 661, 674 f.
17 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 254; Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 667.
18 Code of Criminal Procedure art. 304 (available in English at http://Legifrance.gouv.fr/) 
accessed on 15 July 2009.
19 Id. art. 353.
20 M. Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974–1975, at 6–8 (F. Ewald & A. 
Fontana eds., G. Burchell transl. 2003); Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 666 f.
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The principle of the intime conviction and all the similar (but not identi-
cal) principles concerning the free evaluation of proofs do not by them-
selves entail the adoption of any specific standard of proof, let alone the 
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The history of these prin-
ciples, as well as their systematic role in modern systems, show that they 
have a negative rather than a positive meaning. Their negative meaning 
is that to the extent they are applied (which is in many cases a matter of 
degree) they exclude the application of rules of legal proof (i.e., rules 
determining in general and binding terms the probative force of specific 
items of evidence), vesting the court with the power to determine the 
weight of proofs on the basis of a discretionary evaluation. In a word: 
these principles exclude the application of legal standards of proof but do 
not prescribe by themselves any positive standard of proof.21
I would amend Taruffo’s statement in one significant respect. I believe the ref-
erences to the judge’s “conviction” in the French “intime conviction” standard 
and the German criminal and civil code provisions quoted above do provide a 
minimum standard of persuasion: the judge is required to have a conviction or 
belief regarding the truth of the fact at issue. This is the core of the civil law 
approach to proof, which is thought to be absent in the common law’s prepon-
derance and balance of probability standards. Taruffo himself subsequently 
emphasizes that “not only is truth the main goal stated by the already men-
tioned § 286 of the Zivilprozessordnung, the search for truth is the main refer-
ence point of the German legal theory concerning the problems of proof ….”22
However, I agree with the basic point that Taruffo makes: the “intime convic-
tion” standard by itself does not specify what degree of conviction is required. 
Its conjunction with the presumption of innocence and, more specifically, the 
benefit of the doubt that a juror in the Assize Court is required to grant to 
the defendant in art. 304 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides 
support to those who restate the criminal standard as a “deep-seated” or “pro-
found” conviction,23 perhaps comparable to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard but perhaps only requiring something like the “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard. However, there is no support in the French codes for re-
quiring any particular degree of “inner conviction” in civil actions.
Kevin Clermont and Emily Sherwin argue that the strong preference that civil 
plaintiffs have in France for joining their civil action to a related criminal action 
(as allowed in France and some other civil law jurisdictions) proves that the stan-
dard of persuasion in the civil action is at least as high as (the assumed) very high 
standard in the criminal action; otherwise civil plaintiffs would prefer to pursue 
their action in the civil courts rather than the criminal courts even though they, 
rather than the public prosecutor, would bear the costs of litigation.24
21 Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 666.
22 Id. 675.
23 E.g, Foucault (fn. 20) 7 ff. (“profound”); Vouin, JCLCPS 52 (1961) 275 ff. (“deep-seated”).
24 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 264.
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There are a number of problems with this argument. First, even if the standards 
were the same, the standard could be low rather than high. Taruffo makes this 
point with particular reference to the situation in Italy, where plaintiffs also have a 
strong preference for joining their civil action with the related criminal action. He 
notes that a recent overview of the Italian case law “shows that Italian courts in 
deciding civil cases adopt very flexible standards of proof, based essentially upon 
the discretion of the judge, without any reference to the standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt,”25 and that the late Federico Stella, a leading Italian scholar and 
prominent practitioner of criminal law, strongly criticized the Italian courts for ap-
plying in criminal actions “the much lower standard, that is typical of civil cases, 
of the prevailing probability” rather than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” stan-
dard.26 Stella’s criticism actually was even stronger: he faulted the Italian courts 
for applying a stricter standard of persuasion in civil cases than in criminal cases, 
and he forcefully argued for the adoption of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” stan-
dard in criminal actions and the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in civil 
actions in place of the amorphous and manipulable “inner persuasion” standard.27
Second, Clermont and Sherwin’s argument ignores the very high costs of liti-
gating in the civil courts, especially given the “loser pays” rule under which the 
loser of the civil case has to pay the litigation costs of the other party, which 
often would make pursuing one’s civil action in the criminal proceeding the 
only financially feasible option, or at least so much cheaper as to outweigh the 
advantage of a lower standard of persuasion in the civil court.
Third, Clermont and Sherwin’s argument assumes the point supposedly being 
proven, that the criminal courts apply the same standard of persuasion in the 
joined civil action as in the criminal action.
If the civil standard of persuasion were (at least) as high as the criminal stan-
dard of persuasion, the acquittal of the defendant in a criminal action should 
have conclusive effect in any non-final civil action involving the same facts. 
The fact that this at one time was the case in France, despite the absence of 
any code provision mandating that result, has been put forth by Clermont and 
Sherwin as evidence of the identity of the criminal and civil standards in civil 
law jurisdictions, even though they state that the same rule does not apply 
in most of France’s neighboring countries.28 However, recent changes to the 
25 Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 665 fn. 26, citing F. Carpi/M. Taruffo (eds.), Commentario breve al 
codice di procedura civile. Complemento giurisprudenziale (3rd ed. 2002) 477. Examples of 
the widely varying standards that have been employed by the Italian courts with respect to the 
causation issue in medical malpractice cases are provided in a forthcoming paper by Claudia 
DiMarzo: Trib. Florence 2222 [1999] (“reasonable certainty”); Cass. Civ. 11522 [1997] (“con-
crete, actual and not hypothetical possibility of a favorable outcome”); Cass. Civ. 4725 [1993] 
(“reasonable certainty about the existence of a not insignificant probability”); Cass. Civ. 4044 
[1994] (“moral certainty”); Cass. Civ. 1286 [1998] (“reliable and significant possibility of a 
favorable outcome”).
26 Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 665, citing F. Stella, Giustizia e modernità (2nd ed. 2002) 147, 328.
27 Stella (fn. 26); F. Stella, Causation in Products Liability and Exposure to Toxic Substances: A 
European View, in: M.S. Madden (ed.), Exploring Tort Law (2005) 403 ff.
28 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 263 f.
21 
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French Code of Criminal Procedure, beginning in 1983, explicitly state that the 
civil action can proceed, in the criminal court or the civil court as appropriate, 
despite the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action.29 This makes little 
sense unless, as in common law jurisdictions, the civil standard is lower than 
the criminal standard.
Speculation about the identity or divergence of the criminal and civil standards 
of persuasion is no longer necessary with respect to the situation in Italy. The 
Italian Supreme Court of Cassation has explicitly adopted the “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” standard for criminal actions and the “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard for civil actions, while emphasizing that satisfaction of the 
preponderance standard requires evidence specific to the particular case rather 
than a mere statistical probability:
As this Court has previously stated, the main difference [between the 
penal and civil processes] is in the standards of proof that each system 
requires (Cass. Pen., S.U., 11.09.2002, n. 30328).
The Penal Code requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” while the 
Civil Code merely requires a “preponderance of the evidence.” The dif-
ferent standards correspond to the different values at stake in each system 
(Cass. 16.10.2007, n. 21619; Cass. 18.04.2007, n. 9238; Cass. 05.09.2006, 
n. 19047; Cass. 04.03.2004, n. 4400; Cass. 21.01.2000, n. 632).
The Court of Justice CE has recently stated that causation cannot be based 
on probabilities (CGCE 13.07.2006, n. 295; CGCE 15.02.2005, n. 12).
The concept of “probabilistic certainty” is a standard that is necessary 
in all civil cases. The mere statistical likelihood that one act or omis-
sion caused certain harm is not enough to impose liability. Probabilistic 
certainty also requires evidence from the specific case to support that 
statistical likelihood.30
In civil law jurisdictions other than Italy, there is little empirical information 
regarding the standards of persuasion actually applied by the courts, and some-
times very little guidance in judicial opinions, especially in France, where appel-
late judges do not review facts and write extremely short, conclusive opinions 
with minimal if any elaboration of standards or rationales.31 However, anecdotal 
evidence indicates that, as in Italy,32 the standard of persuasion in France, even in 
criminal proceedings,33 varies depending on the discretion of the judge. This is 
also said to be the case in Germany.34 Even Clermont and Sherwin conclude that 
29 E.g., Code of Criminal Procedure art. 4-1, 371 f., 470–1.
30 Cass. Civ. Sez. Un. 581 [2008] § 3.9 (translated by Claudia DiMarzo, University of Palermo). 
The concept of “probabilistic certainty” is discussed in Part D below.
31 See Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 254, 257.
32 See supra no. 21.
33 E.g., Foucault (fn. 20) 8–11.
34 Murray/Stürner (fn. 4) 310 ff.; P. Gottwald, “Fact Finding: A German Perspective,” in: D.L.C. 
Miller/P. R. Beaumont (eds.), The Option of Litigating in Europe (1993) 67, 77 (stating that 
German courts apply a preponderance standard “with regard to prima facie cases, to causation, 
to negligence and to assessment of damages”).
25 
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the supposed identity of the (very high) criminal and civil standards of persua-
sion in civil law jurisdictions is a myth, which they argue is purposely main-
tained by the courts to shore up their legitimacy.35 They state that “civil-law 
judges likely apply a haphazardly variable civil standard of proof,”36 and they 
cite scholars who believe that the civil standard is closer to the preponderance 
standard than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.37 However, contrary 
to Clermont and Sherwin’s identification of the civil standard of persuasion 
with mere statistical probability,38 civil-law judges and lawyers generally seem 
to agree with the Italian court’s rejection of that identification and its insistence 
that evidence specific to the particular case is necessary in order to form the 
required conviction regarding what actually happened in that case.39
C. THE STANDARDS OF PERSUASION IN THE 
COMMON LAW
As I have previously noted, many academics in both common law and civil 
law jurisdictions assume that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard 
of persuasion, at least as employed in the United States, merely requires a 
50+ percent statistical probability. The same assumption applies, through lit-
eral interpretation, to the “balance of probability” standard that is employed 
in common-law jurisdictions outside the United States. For both standards, 
as so interpreted, it would be better to employ the term “standard of proof” 
rather than “standard of persuasion,” since the latter implies an element of 
conviction or belief that is lacking when all that is involved is a class-based 
statistical probability. Happily, however, the term “standard of persuasion” can 
be retained without awkwardness or misdescription, since the statistical prob-
ability interpretation of these standards, as they are usually understood and 
applied, is incorrect. The evidence that I provide in support of this statement is 
limited to the preponderance standard, due to limitations of space and personal 
knowledge. However, I believe that similar evidence could easily be adduced 
for the “balance of probability” standard by someone knowledgeable about the 
practice in a jurisdiction that employs that standard. Additional arguments ap-
plicable to both standards are provided in Part E below.
Contrary to the common assumption among academics, the preponderance 
standard in the United States has traditionally been understood by judges and 
presented to juries as a standard of conviction or belief regarding the truth of 
the fact(s) at issue rather than as a matter of mere mathematical or statistical 
probability. A widely employed pattern jury instruction states:
35 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 258 f., 269 ff.
36 Id. 273.
37 Id. 261, citing, among other sources, ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational 
Civil Procedure P-18A, R-31E (Discussion Draft No. 3, 2002). See also Murray/Stürner (fn. 4) 
310 ff.
38 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 265.
39 Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 659, 663 f., 667–71; EC EJN Evidence and Proof (fn. 4).
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To “establish by a preponderance of the evidence” means to prove that 
something is more likely so than not so. In other words, a preponderance 
of the evidence in the case means such evidence as, when considered 
and compared with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and 
produces in your minds belief that what is sought to be proved is more 
likely true than not true. This rule does not, of course, require proof to an 
absolute certainty, since proof to an absolute certainty is seldom possible 
in any case.40
The core of this instruction is essentially identical to the standards of persua-
sion enunciated in the German codes of criminal and civil procedure. While 
the American instruction does not include the “free evaluation of the evidence” 
principle that is stressed in the German provisions, it has the same focus on the 
required formation of a conviction or belief in the truth of the facts at issue. 
In addition, unlike the German provisions, it specifies the required degree of 
that belief. The required degree of belief is by a bare preponderance of the 
evidence, barely sufficient for the formation of a belief in the truth of the facts 
at issue: the slightest degree of belief,41 rather than the much stronger degrees 
of belief required under the “clear and convincing evidence” or “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” standards, which are more literally worded belief (rather than 
mere probability) standards.
As in the quoted instruction, jury instructions in the Unites States generally 
refer to proof that the disputed fact is “more probably true than not true,” rather 
than simply “more likely than not” as a matter of abstract class-based statis-
tics. 42 When “more likely than not” or some similar phrase is employed, it is 
usually clear from the surrounding language that the phrase is not being used 
to refer to a mere 50+ percent statistical probability, but rather to refer to the 
truth of what actually happened on the particular occasion.
Few American judges, jurors, or laypersons interpret the “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard or even the “more probable than not” standard as merely 
requiring a 50+ percent statistical probability. In the well-known Cipillone 
case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit questioned attempts by 
some courts and commentators to use mere statistics to define and prove “but 
for” causation:
40 E.H. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (Civil) (4th ed. 1987) vol. 3 § 72.01, 
at 32 (emphasis added); see R.W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked 
Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, Iowa Law Review 
(Iowa L Rev) 73 (1988) 1001, 1065 and fns. 337–339 (citing numerous sources).
41 See Livanovitch v. Livanovitch, 131 A. 799, 800 (Vt. 1926) (“If … you are more inclined to 
believe from the evidence that he did so deliver the bonds to the defendant, even though your 
belief is only the slightest degree greater than that he did not, your verdict should be for the 
plaintiff.” (quoting the trial court’s jury instructions)).
42 E.g., Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, Illinois 
Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil (2006) §  21.01 (“more probably true than not true”); short form: 
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions; L. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions (2007) vol. 4, 
§ 73.01, Instruction 73–2 (stating that “by a preponderance of the evidence” means “more likely 
true than not true,” considering the “weight” and “quality and persuasiveness” of the evidence).
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We are not convinced that when a jury determines that “but for” a defen-
dant’s conduct, the injury would not have occurred, it is determining that 
the chances of that injury being the result of defendant’s conduct are 50% or 
greater. Traditionally, jury instructions have been in words, not numbers.43
When asked to do so by researchers, many judges similarly object to inter-
preting standards of persuasion in terms of quantitative probabilities.44 In one 
survey, 80 out of 255 judges refused to specify a probability sufficient for a 
“preponderance of the evidence” finding.45 Of the judges who were willing to 
do so, only about three-fifths chose a probability of 50 to 55 percent; about 
two-fifths chose a probability of 60 percent or greater, almost one-fifth a prob-
ability of 70 percent or greater, one-tenth a probability of 80 percent or great-
er, and one-twentieth a probability of 90 to 100 percent.46 The distribution of 
probabilities was about the same for the “more probable than not” standard.47 
Laypersons – jurors and students – were even less willing to interpret the pre-
ponderance standard as a mere 50+ percent probability. About four-fifths of 
the laypersons chose a probability of 70 percent or greater, half a probability 
of 80 percent or greater, and more than one-tenth a probability of 95 to 100 
percent.48 Over 90 percent of the judges and about two-thirds of the laypersons 
were opposed to having jurors simply make a probability finding, which the 
judge would then use to determine liability.49 Trial consultants advise Ameri-
can plaintiffs’ lawyers that “[m]any jurors will not agree to decide on the basis 
of 80 percent or 70 percent or 60 percent certainty,” but rather “expect you to 
prove your case beyond a reasonable doubt, and you won’t change their minds 
by explaining preponderance.” Instead, the trial consultants advise, repeatedly 
get witnesses to testify that something is “more likely right than wrong” and, 
“beyond that,” that they are “certain” of the truth of the fact at issue.50
American courts also usually agree with the civil law jurisdictions that, to 
prove what actually happened in a particular case – to establish what the facts 
actually were in that case – the party with the burden of persuasion regarding 
43 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 Federal Reporter, Second Series (F.2d) 541, 561 fn. 17 
(3rd Cir. 1990).
44 C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees?, Vanderbilt Law Review (Vand L Rev) 35 (1982) 1293, 1332; R.J. Simon/L. Ma-
han, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, Law 
and Society Review (L Soc Rev) 5 (1971) 319, 329 (quoting judges as stating that “[p]ercent-
ages or probabilities simply cannot encompass all the factors, tangible and intangible, in deter-
mining guilt – evidence cannot be evaluated in such terms”).
45 McCauliff, Vand L Rev 35 (1982) 1325 fn. 184, 1330.
46 Id. 1331; Simon/Mahan, L Soc Rev 5 (1971) 324 f., 327 table 7.
47 McCauliff, Vand L Rev 35 (1982) 1331.
48 Simon/Mahan, L Soc Rev 5 (1971) 327 table 7; see also D.K. Kagehiro/W.C. Stanton, Legal vs. 
Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, Law and Human Behavior 9 (1985) 159, 164, 169 
(discussing an empirical study demonstrating a divergence between subjects’ findings under 
the preponderance standard and a quantified 51 percent standard, with results closer to those 
obtained under the preponderance standard even when the two standards were combined in the 
same instruction).
49 Simon/Mahan, L Soc Rev 5 (1971) 329, 330 fn. 8.
50 D. Ball, Making Preponderance Work, Trial (Mar. 2008) 38 ff.
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those facts must employ evidence specific to that particular case, rather than 
mere statistical probabilities. In an often quoted statement, the Supreme Court 
of Massachusetts stated:
It has been held not enough that mathematically the chances somewhat 
favor a proposition to be proved; for example, the fact that colored auto-
mobiles made in the current year outnumber black ones would not war-
rant a finding that an undescribed automobile of the current year is col-
ored and not black, nor would the fact that only a minority of men die of 
cancer warrant a finding that a particular man did not die of cancer. The 
weight or ponderance of evidence is its power to convince the tribunal 
which has the determination of the fact, of the actual truth of the proposi-
tion to be proved. After the evidence has been weighed, that proposition 
is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if it is made to appear more 
likely or probable in the sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from 
the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding 
any doubts that may still linger there.51
Jury instructions often refer to the “weight” of the evidence.52 Abstract class-
based statistics do not have weight. Only concrete “particularistic” evidence 
specific to the particular case has weight.
In sum, contrary to a widespread perception, there is strong agreement between 
civil law and common law jurisdictions regarding the standards of persuasion. 
True persuasion requires the formation of a conviction or belief regarding the 
truth of the facts at issue, and such belief cannot rationally be based on mere 
class-based statistics, but rather must be based on evidence specific to the par-
ticular instance. Furthermore, the required degree of belief varies in criminal 
actions and civil actions, given the different interests at stake in each action. 
For criminal actions, a very high degree of belief is required: no reasonable 
doubt can remain. For most issues in civil actions, however, the standard of 
persuasion is much lower: all that is required is the formation of a bare, mini-
mal personal belief (“intime conviction”) by the trier of fact in the truth of the 
facts at issue, as required by the usual understanding in practice (rather than in 
academia) of the preponderance of the evidence standard.
However, a critical objection or question remains. How is such a conviction 
or belief formed? Nothing is certain. All evidence, including particularistic 
evidence specific to the particular occasion – for example, fingerprint evidence 
and (especially) eyewitness testimony – merely gives rise to a probability re-
garding the facts at issue.53 Does it then make any sense to distinguish between 
51 Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 North Eastern Reporter, Second Series (N.E.2d) 825, 827 
(Mass. 1940) (citations omitted).
52 E.g., Sand (fn. 42) § 73.01, Instruction 73–2 (stating that “by a preponderance of the evidence” 
means “more likely true than not true,” considering the “weight” and “quality and persuasive-
ness” of the evidence).
53 The difficulties of attributing a specific piece of evidence to a particular source are examined 
in National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward (2009).
34 
35 
36 
Proving Facts: Belief versus Probability 91
probability and belief? Even Taruffo apparently does not think that it does. 
Although he is critical of statistical probability interpretations of the standards 
of persuasion, he is also critical of standards that take seriously the concepts of 
conviction, belief, or truth.54
D. PROBABILITIES AND BELIEF55
The proponents of the 50+ percent statistical probability interpretation rely on 
the truth that all evidence, including the particularistic evidence that is gener-
ally insisted upon by courts in both civil law and common law jurisdictions, is 
ultimately probabilistic. However, they fail to recognize that there are different 
types of probabilities, and that these different types of probabilities have dif-
fering relevance depending on the type of inquiry at issue.
In litigation and ordinary life, we are usually interested in determining what 
has actually happened in the past or predicting what is likely to or may happen 
in the future. Both types of inquiry rely on causal generalizations, which are 
incompletely specified causal laws. A causal law is a law of nature; it describes 
an invariable, nonprobabilistic connection between some fully specified set of 
antecedent conditions and some consequent condition, such that whenever all 
the listed antecedent conditions are instantiated on a particular occasion, that 
complete instantiation necessarily will produce the instantiation of the conse-
quent condition.56 The antecedent conditions and the consequent condition are 
described as abstract types, which cannot in themselves cause anything. An 
actual singular instance of causation consists of the complete instantiation of a 
causal law on a particular occasion.
Our knowledge of the content of causal laws is based on experience and em-
pirical investigation. The existence of such a law is usually inferred from ob-
servation of a constant or frequent conjunction between occurrences of some 
set of antecedent conditions and the subsequent (or simultaneous) occurrence 
of some other condition. However, the mere existence of a frequent, or even a 
constant, conjunction is not sufficient to establish a causal relation.57 Scientists 
engage in carefully designed experiments to determine whether there is an 
actual causal relation or, instead, the correlation is spurious, and, if there does 
seem to be a causal relation, to determine the direction of causation and, to the 
extent possible, all of the antecedent conditions in the causal law.
54 Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 669–71.
55 Some of the text in this Part and the prior Part is excerpted from Wright, Iowa L Rev 73 (1988) 
and R. Wright, Liability for Possible Wrongs: Causation, Statistical Probability, and the Burden 
of Proof, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review (Loy LA L Rev) 41 (2008) 1295.
56 I have made no attempt to avoid circular use of causal terminology, since the exposition here 
is not intended to be an analysis of the meaning of causation but rather an explanation of the 
relationships among causation, probability and belief. 
57 A.B. Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of Medicine 58 (1965) 295; A. Scales, Legal Feminism: Activism, Lawyering, and 
Legal Theory (2006) 171 f.
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Our knowledge of causal laws is almost always incomplete, and even when it 
is complete we rarely refer to completely specified causal laws. We rather em-
ploy causal generalizations, which are incompletely specified causal laws that 
have only as much specificity as is possible and needed to resolve the causal 
issue in the particular situation. Since the causal generalization is not a com-
plete specification of the causal law, instantiation of all of the antecedent con-
ditions in the causal generalization does not guarantee the instantiation of the 
consequent condition. Instead, there is only a probability that the consequent 
condition will be instantiated. This probability is what I have called an ex ante 
causal probability. It is an aggregate, class-based probability associated with 
a particular causal generalization that describes the frequency of instantiation 
of the consequent condition given the complete instantiation of the antecedent 
conditions.
Ex ante causal probabilities are useful, indeed necessary, for causal prediction 
– predicting what is likely to or may happen in the future. However, they have 
only limited, redundant utility in causal explanation – explaining what actu-
ally happened on a particular occasion. As noted above, significant statistical 
correlations, such as are provided by epidemiological evidence, can be used 
– and often are used – to infer a general causal relation, what is often referred 
to in the law as “causal capacity” or “general causation.” By themselves they 
are never sufficient (or necessary) for inferring a causal relation. However, if 
the causal relation is confirmed, the statistical frequency becomes an ex ante 
causal probability, which can be used for causal prediction.
Reference to an ex ante causal probability does not assist in establishing what 
is often referred to as “specific causation”: the actual instantiation of the rel-
evant causal generalization and its underlying causal law on a particular occa-
sion. Reference to the statistical frequency that has been confirmed as an ex 
ante causal probability merely redundantly confirms and quantifies the “causal 
capacity” of the conditions in the antecedent of the causal generalization when 
they are instantiated. It does not provide any information about the actual in-
stantiation of those conditions on a particular occasion. 
An abstract ex ante causal probability associated with some possibly appli-
cable causal generalization is not evidence of what actually happened on any 
particular occasion because it provides no information on whether the ab-
stract elements in the causal generalization and the underlying causal law 
actually were instantiated on that occasion. It merely states that X percent 
of the time that the known abstract elements in the causal generalization are 
instantiated, the unknown abstract elements required to complete the causal 
law are also instantiated. It does not help us determine whether this particular 
occasion is one of the X percent in which the causal law was fully instanti-
ated, or instead is one of the 100 – X percent in which the causal law was not 
fully instantiated. It can be used to place a bet on what most likely happened, 
but it cannot be used to resolve the bet. If a horse wins 90 percent of its races 
or the odds are 90 percent that a spin of a roulette wheel will not result in 
the ball’s landing on a certain number, no one who placed a bet either way 
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in either situation will consider themselves to have won or lost the bet in the 
absence of specific evidence of the actual outcome of the particular race or 
spin of the wheel.
A judgment on what actually happened on a particular occasion is a judg-
ment on which causal generalization and its underlying causal law was fully 
instantiated on the particular occasion. An item of particularistic evidence 
is a concrete feature of a particular occasion that instantiates, or negates the 
instantiation of, one of the abstract elements in a possibly applicable causal 
generalization. Particularistic evidence connects a possibly applicable causal 
generalization to the particular occasion by instantiating the abstract elements 
in the causal generalization, thereby converting the abstract generalization 
into an instantiated generalization. Without such particularistic evidence, 
there is no basis for applying the causal generalization to the particular occa-
sion.
To determine whether a specific causal law was fully instantiated, we use 
particularistic evidence to assess, non-quantitatively, the ex post probability 
that each of the abstract elements in the relevant causal law was instantiated 
– what I have called an ex post causal probability. This ex post causal prob-
ability of complete instantiation is distinct and independent from the ex ante 
causal probability associated with the relevant causal generalization. The ex 
post probability for complete instantiation of the causal law is equal to the 
lowest ex post probability for instantiation of any constituent element. The ex 
post probability for instantiation of the known abstract elements listed in the 
causal generalization is either based on direct particularistic evidence of such 
instantiation or, as with the unknown abstract elements required to complete 
the causal law, is circumstantially inferred from particularistic evidence of the 
network of causal relationships that encompasses the particular occasion. The 
final judgment on what actually happened depends on whether, in the mind of 
the trier of fact, the unquantified ex post probability associated with a possibly 
applicable causal generalization – the ex post probability, based on all the par-
ticularistic evidence, that the causal law underlying the causal generalization 
was fully instantiated – is sufficient, in comparison with the unquantified ex 
post probability associated with competing causal generalizations, to produce 
in the trier of fact the required degree of belief in the truth of the fact that the 
first causal generalization and its underlying law were the ones that were fully 
instantiated on the particular occasion.
A “naked statistic” is an accidental (non-causally related) distribution or fre-
quency of occurrence – for example, the fact that most of the taxis in a town are 
operated by a particular company or that most of the bolts used by a particu-
lar manufacturer were supplied by a particular supplier. If the “preponderance 
of the evidence” and “balance of probability” standards of persuasion merely 
require proof of a 50+ percent statistical probability, a 50+ percent “naked sta-
tistic” should suffice to prove the fact at issue. Yet, when such naked statistics 
are presented to courts, in the United States or elsewhere, as alleged proof of 
the fact that it was the defendant’s instrumentality (e.g., taxi or defective bolt) 
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that tortiously caused the plaintiff’s injury, they are almost always properly 
rejected as being irrelevant.58
Ex ante causal probabilities are relevant and necessary for causal prediction; they 
are irrelevant for causal explanation. Conversely, ex post causal probabilities 
are relevant and necessary for causal explanation; they are irrelevant for causal 
prediction. Naked statistics are irrelevant for both causal explanation and causal 
prediction, although they can be used to place a bet on the fact at issue.
The distinction between causal prediction and causal explanation underlies and 
supports the different standards of persuasion in sec. 286 and 287 of the Ger-
man Code of Civil Procedure. Sec. 287, which deals with the determination of 
the damages resulting from a legal wrong, does not have sec. 286’s reference 
to the necessary “conviction” of the trier of fact:
If it is controversial between the parties whether any damage was caused 
or the extent of the damage or of a compensable interest, it shall be de-
cided by the court at its free discretion by taking into consideration all the 
circumstances.59
As the drafters of sec. 287 must have understood, no belief can be formed, but 
rather only predictions can be made, about the amount of future damages. Thus, 
sec. 287 omits the requirement that the trier of fact form a belief regarding such 
damages. The actual occurrence of the legal wrong is an issue of past fact or 
causal explanation, which is governed by sec. 286, which properly requires the 
trier of fact to be convinced of the actual occurrence of the legal wrong. The de-
termination of past damages is also an issue of past fact for which ex ante causal 
probabilities are irrelevant. However, on this issue most jurisdictions are willing, 
as the drafters of sec. 287 were,60 to let the plaintiff recover damages even if there 
is insufficient proof for the trier of fact to form a belief regarding the precise 
amount, as long as there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable estimation.
The failure to perceive the distinctions among the different types of probabili-
ties and their disparate relevance to the different types of inquiries that arise 
in litigation exists in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. However, 
contrary to Clermont and Sherwin’s claim that the judges, lawyers and aca-
demics in civil law jurisdictions are far behind those in the common law juris-
dictions (especially the United States) in their understanding of the relation-
ship between probability and proof and related liability issues,61 I agree with 
58 E.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359–60 (7th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Rapid 
Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945); Wright, Iowa L Rev 73 (1988) 1050 fn. 271. In 
the Howard case and again in United States v. Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2003), Judge 
Posner repeats the mathematical probabilists’ “missing evidence” argument to try to explain the 
courts’ rejection of such naked statistics. The flaws in that argument are discussed in Wright, 
Iowa L Rev 73 (1988) 1055 f.
59 Goren (fn. 15) 73.
60 Murray/Stürner (fn. 4) 312 f.; van Dam (fn. 2) 281 f.; van Gerven/Lever/Larouche (fn. 2) sec. 
4.2.3, 428/17.
61 Clermont/Sherwin, AJCL 50 (2002) 252–58, 273 f.
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Taruffo that it is those in the civil law jurisdictions that generally have a bet-
ter understanding.62 Although, for the most part, their understanding has been 
intuitive rather than explained, they have understood more clearly, consistently 
and explicitly that neither ex ante causal probabilities nor naked statistics are 
relevant on the issue of what actually happened in a particular case, which 
must instead be proven through particularistic evidence that is specific to the 
particular situation, which alone is capable of supporting the necessary belief 
in what actually happened.
Jurisprudence in Italy has advanced further, particularly through the work of the 
late Federico Stella, who developed an analysis of proof based on complete in-
stantiation of causal laws that is similar to but significantly different from the 
analysis in this Part. Stella distinguished a concept of “logical probability” from 
mere statistical probability. However, Stella’s concept of logical probability was 
what I have called an ex ante causal probability (the frequency of occurrence of 
the consequent of a causal generalization given instantiation of the antecedent 
conditions).63 To establish actual causation in a particular instance, he insisted, the 
causal generalization being used must be an (almost) fully specified causal law, 
with a “logical probability” close to one, and there must be sufficient particular-
istic evidence specific to the particular case to enable the trier of fact to conclude 
that it was completely instantiated.64 This obviously is an extremely high standard 
of persuasion, as Stella as a criminal defense lawyer certainly intended it to be, in 
order to put a halt to Italian criminal convictions based merely on statistical prob-
ability and increased risk, which sometimes occurred even with statistical prob-
abilities of less than 50 percent, and in order to have the standard of persuasion 
in criminal cases effectively raised to the level of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”65
Stella’s goals seemed to be achieved in the landmark Franzese opinion of the Full 
Bench of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of Cassation in 2002.66 The 
court, employing Stella’s “logical probability” terminology, held that findings of 
62 See Taruffo, AJCL 51 (2003) 662 ff.
63 F. Stella, The Vitality of the Covering Law Model: Considerations on Wright and Mackie 
(available at http://works.bepress.com/richard_wright/34/) accessed on 16 July 2009, at 5 
(translation by F. Stella of La vitalità del modello della sussunzione sotto leggi. A confronto il 
pensiero di Wright e Mackie, in: F. Stella, I Saperi del Giudice. La Causalità e Il Ragionevole 
Dubbio (2004) 1–70).
64 Ibid.; F. Stella, Criminal omissions, causality, probability, counterfactuals: Medical-surgical 
activity (available at http://works.bepress.com/richard_wright/35/) accessed on 16 July 2009, at 
14–18, 23 f. (translation by F. Stella of Causalità omissiva, probabilità, giudizi controfattuali: 
l’attività medico-chirurgica, in: F. Stella, Il Giudice Corpuscolariano. La Cultura delle Prove 
(2005) 201–43. Taruffo also refers to a concept of “logical probability” that is distinct from mere 
statistical probability, which however he attributes “mainly” to Jonathan Cohen. Taruffo, AJCL 
51 (2003) 664 and fn. 20 (citing L.J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable (1977)); see id. 659, 
669. The distinction that I make between causal prediction and causal explanation and the related 
distinction between ex ante causal probability and ex post causal probability is loosely based on 
Jonathan Cohen’s distinction between “Pascalian” frequentist probability and “Baconian” induc-
tive probability. See Wright, Iowa L Rev 73 (1988) 1044 ff. Cohen himself seems not to have fully 
grasped – or to have lost sight of – these distinctions. See Wright 1063 fn. 329.
65 See Stella (fn. 64) 1–2 (English translation).
66 Cass. Crim. Sez. Un. 30328/02, Franzese [2002].
51 
52 
96 Richard W. Wright
causation and criminal liability cannot be based merely on increased risk or even 
a high statistical probability of causation, but rather require resort to a rationally 
credible “covering law” and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, through particular-
istic evidence specific to the occasion, of the “real conditioning efficacy of [the 
conduct at issue] in the causal web.”67 However, the precise nature of the “logical 
probability” standard established in Franzese apparently was not too clear and 
results in subsequent cases have been mixed.68 In the recent opinion of the Full 
Bench of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Cassation, which is quoted 
in Part B above, the same restrictions and requirements are stated and labeled 
“probabilistic certainty,” with however proof by a “preponderance of the evi-
dence” being substituted for proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” in civil actions.69
When Stella became aware of the analysis that is briefly described in this Part, 
which I previously have extensively elaborated and defended,70 he treated it 
as being essentially identical to his analysis by submerging the significant 
difference between his concept of logical probability and my concept of ex 
post causal probability,71 which however he described as “complet[ing] and 
defin[ing] my point of view on the application of the covering law model.”72 
I greatly regret that his untimely death prevented us from embarking on a 
planned comparison and refinement of our respective views.
E. PROOF BY STATISTICAL PROBABILITY: PROBLEMS 
AND PARADOXES73
1. Indeterminate Defendants: The Alternative Causation Doctrine and 
Proportional Market Share Liability
In both common law and civil law jurisdictions, an alternative causation doctrine 
is commonly applied in situations like the typical hunting accident situation, in 
which two (or more) defendants each fire in the direction of the plaintiff, who 
was hit by only one pellet, and it is impossible for the plaintiff to prove which 
defendant fired the pellet that injured him. In order to achieve a second-best just 
result in situations like this, when each defendant behaved tortiously and may 
have thereby caused the plaintiff’s injury but it is impossible for the plaintiff to 
prove which defendant actually caused her injury, the courts shift the burden to 
each defendant to prove that she did not injure the plaintiff and hold each defen-
dant who is unable to do so jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s injury.74
67 See Stella (fn. 64) 5–6 (English translation).
68 Id. at 2–3, 23 ff.; V. Grembi, Trends and Duration of Medical Malpractice Cases: Some Evi-
dence From the Italian Court of Cassation Decisions (1970–2005) (available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/abstract=983039) accessed on 16 July 2009, at 11.
69 See supra no. 25.
70 Wright, Iowa L Rev 73 (1988) 1044 ff.
71 See Stella (fn. 64) 4 f., 12–16; Stella (fn. 63) 2 f., 7–10 (English translation).
72 Stella (fn. 63) 10 (English translation).
73 Much of this Part is excerpted from Wright, Loy LA L Rev 41 (2008) 1295.
74 Id. 1299 ff.; van Dam (fn. 2) 287 ff.; van Gerven/Lever/Larouche (fn. 2) sec. 4.4.3.
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However, if there are more than two defendants and the standard of persuasion 
is satisfied by a mere 50+ percent statistical probability, the statistical prob-
abilities by themselves ordinarily would enable each defendant to prove that 
she was not the cause of the injury, even though it is certain that one of the 
defendants caused the injury. For example, if there were three defendants, each 
equally likely to have been the cause of the plaintiff’s injury, each defendant 
can “prove” that she was not the cause, since there is a 67 percent probability 
that she was not the cause, which leads to the paradoxical result that it can be 
“proven” that none of the defendants was the cause, even though we know that 
one of them must have been the cause.
Conversely, using what Mark Geistfeld calls “evidential grouping,”75 the statisti-
cal probability interpretation of the standard of persuasion can be employed it-
eratively to achieve the opposite paradoxical result: “proof” that all but one of 
the initial multiple defendants, each approximately equally likely (or unlikely) 
to have been the actual cause, was the actual cause. At each step in the iteration, 
a smaller group consisting of most of the defendants in the prior group can be 
carved out of the prior group, and the statistical probability interpretation of the 
standard of persuasion can be used to “prove” that this smaller group contains the 
defendant who actually caused the plaintiff’s injury, until we are down to only two 
defendants, one of whom can be “proved” to have been the actual cause if there 
is even a “scintilla” of evidence, statistical or otherwise, to tip the probability one 
way or the other – for example, if the shotgun cartridge fired by one of the hunters 
contained one more pellet than the cartridge fired by the other hunter.76
The courts avoid each of these contrary paradoxical results by refusing to al-
low such naked statistics as proof or disproof of actual causation.77 As the 
reporters for the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Torts state 
(despite their acceptance elsewhere of the statistical probability interpretation 
of the preponderance standard78),
Defendants would be able to satisfy their burden of production [under the 
alternative causation doctrine] when three or more defendants are subject 
to alternative liability [sic] in one of two ways: a defendant might show 
why it was not the cause of plaintiff’s injury or it might show which one 
of the other defendants was the cause.79
To show why she was not the cause or which one of the other defendants was 
the cause, the defendant must produce evidence of the actual causal effect of 
another defendant’s shot or the lack of causal effect of her own shot. To do this, 
75 M.A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market Share Liability, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review (U Pa L Rev) 155 (2006) 447, 464 f., 466, 469.
76 See Wright, Loy LA L Rev 41 (2008) 1312 n. 64, 1330, 1332 f.
77 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Restatement 
Third) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) § 28(b) and cmts. d(1) & e, reporters’ notes; Ameri-
can Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) §§ 433B(2)–(3).
78 American Law Institute, Restatement Third (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) §§ 26 cmt. l & 
illus. 5, n. 28 cmt. a, reporters’ note.
79 Id. § 28 cmt. j, reporters’ note at 565 (emphasis added).
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she must provide concrete particularistic evidence specific to the particular 
occasion, rather than mere abstract ex ante causal probabilities or noncausal 
naked statistics, neither of which provide any information about what actually 
happened on the particular occasion.
When the preponderance standard is properly understood as requiring the for-
mation of a minimal belief in the truth of a disputed fact, based on particular-
istic evidence specific to the particular occasion, the logical inconsistency that 
results from using the statistical probability interpretation of the preponder-
ance standard in the alternative causation cases disappears. As Geistfeld states:
[T]he plaintiff has provided particularistic evidence showing that each 
defendant belongs to the group of [possible] tortfeasors that caused the 
harm, whereas each defendant [using the statistical probability argument] 
only relies upon “quantitative probability” or “the greater chance” that 
the other defendants caused the injury. That evidence, however, is not 
probative of what actually happened on this particular occasion …. To 
avoid liability, a defendant must instead provide [particularistic] evidence 
rebutting the plaintiff’s particularized proof ….80
A further paradox would be produced by the statistical probability interpreta-
tion of the standard of persuasion when the same defendants are repetitively 
implicated as having possibly caused a particular type of injury. The Supreme 
Court of Oregon confronted such a situation in a case involving an injurious 
DPT vaccine that was supplied by one of two defendants, one of which had 
a 73 percent share of the market for the DPT vaccine. Literally applying the 
statistical probability interpretation of the preponderance standard would para-
doxically result in its being “proven” that the defendant with the 73 percent 
market share, who was thus presumably only responsible for approximately 
73 percent of the DPT-related vaccine injuries, caused 100 percent of those in-
juries. Although apparently accepting the statistical probability interpretation 
of the preponderance standard, the court, referring to articles discussing the 
“naked statistics” issue, did not allow either of the two defendants to be held 
liable, even under the alternative causation doctrine.81
The courts in the American DES cases may have faced a similar situation. It 
has been stated that one company, Eli Lilly, may well have supplied, directly 
or indirectly, more than half of the marketed DES.82 It thus is worth noting 
how carefully the Supreme Court of California, in the leading American case, 
phrased its statements on proof of causation of the plaintiff’s injury. The court 
observed that an inference of causation (based on statistical probability) would 
fail “if we measure the chance that any one of the defendants supplied the 
injury-causing drug by the number of possible tortfeasors”83 (rather than by 
80 Geistfeld, U Pa L Rev 155 (2006) 468.
81 Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 751 Pacific Reporters, Second Series (P.2d) 215, 
216 n.1, 222 (Or. 1988)
82 See A.M. Levine, “Gilding the Lilly”: A DES Update, Trial 20 (Dec. 1984) 18, 19 f.
83 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 931 (Cal. 1980) (emphasis added); see id. at 936 f.
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relative market share). Like the Oregon court, the California court also was 
unwilling to apply the alternative causation doctrine in this type of situation, 
since doing so would result in each defendant – even those with a minor share 
of the market – being held fully liable for all of the many DES-related injuries, 
even though the portion of the injuries that each defendant actually caused 
presumably approximated its share of the DES market.84
However, unlike the Oregon court, the California court devised a new sec-
ond-best liability doctrine in an attempt to have each defendant be liable, ap-
proximately, for the share of the total DES-related damages that it presumably 
actually caused, by holding each defendant proportionately liable in each case 
for a share of the damages in that case equal to its share of the DES market.85 
Some courts, in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, have imposed 
more extensive liability in the DES cases, but they have done so as a matter of 
normative policy while recognizing that it is impossible to prove who actually 
caused the plaintiff’s injury in each case.86
2. Toxic Exposures: The Doubling of the Risk Doctrine
Although phrases such as “more likely than not” or “balance of probabilities” 
have long been part of the legal language regarding the standard of persuasion 
in tort law and other areas of civil law, it is only in fairly recent years that they 
have come to be understood as mere statistical probability statements. A major 
locus of this shift in understanding is the toxic tort cases, in which proof often 
depends on, and often consists solely of, statistical epidemiological evidence. 
As I discussed in Part D above,87 such evidence is very useful, although neither 
necessary nor sufficient, in establishing that a toxic substance is capable of 
causing a particular kind of injury – the causal capacity or “general causation” 
issue – and, if such causal capacity has been sufficiently established, in predict-
ing possible results ex ante or comparing possible causes ex post for purposes 
of remedial treatment. However, such evidence has also incorrectly come to be 
viewed by many courts as being sufficient to prove the actual occurrence of 
the relevant causal process on a particular occasion – “specific causation” – if 
exposures to the substance more than double, in the aggregate, the frequency 
of occurrence of that kind of injury, so that it can be said, whenever that kind of 
injury occurs following exposure to the substance, that the injury was (statisti-
cally) “more likely than not” caused by the exposure to the substance.88
As in the indeterminate defendant cases, the statistical probability interpreta-
tion of the burden of persuasion produces odd results in the toxic exposure 
84 Id. 1325.
85 Id. 1325 f.
86 B. v. Bayer Nederland BV, Hoge Raad 9 October 1992, [1994] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 
535 (C.J.H.B.); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 34 North Western Reporter (N.W.2d) 37 (Wis. 1984); 
Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
87 See supra no. 39.
88 E.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1313–14, 1318–22 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 655 (4th 
Cir. 1987); American Law Institute (fn. 78) § 28 cmt. c(4).
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cases. When exposure to a substance more than doubles the risk, the “dou-
bling+” doctrine will result in defendants being held liable for every instance 
of the injury that occurs following exposure to the substance, even if there is no 
evidence that the substance actually caused the injury on any particular occa-
sion, and even though exposure to the substance could only have caused a por-
tion of the injuries. For example, if exposure to the substance barely doubles 
the frequency of occurrence of the injury, so that just over half of the injuries 
that occur following exposure to the substance are caused by that exposure, 
defendants nevertheless will be held liable in every case, for all of the inju-
ries. Conversely, when, as is usually the case, exposure to the substance does 
not more than double the frequency of occurrence of the injury, no defendant 
will be liable for any of the injuries that occur following exposure to the sub-
stance, no matter how many may actually have been caused by such exposure, 
even though as many as half of the injuries may be due to exposure to the 
substance. It is remarkable that such a miniscule difference in statistical prob-
ability should be thought to result in such a dramatic difference in the supposed 
proof of causation and resultant liability.89
Some American courts recognize this. As one such court stated, “numerous 
jurisdictions have rejected medical experts’ conclusions based upon a ‘prob-
ability,’ a ‘likelihood,’ and an opinion that something is ‘more likely than not’ 
as insufficient medical proof,” and instead have required that the expert ex-
press a “reasonable medical certainty” about the fact at issue.90 Unfortunately, 
“reasonable certainty” standards are not employed and have no meaning in the 
medical and scientific communities, so the plaintiff’s attorney can and often 
does fill the semantic void, and the plaintiff’s expert then employs the required 
terminology.91
Doctors and scientists understand that a mere statistical probability, while 
useful for diagnosis and prediction, is insufficient to establish what actually 
happened in a particular case. Thus, if an expert’s opinion regarding actual 
causation, whether couched in terms of “reasonable certainty”, “more likely 
than not”, or “preponderance of the evidence”, is based only on a statistical 
probability (as is usually true in the toxic exposure cases), a good defense at-
torney will ask the expert, “Can you say whether the plaintiff’s exposure to the 
[relevant substance] actually caused the [relevant specific harm] in this case?” 
The expert – if honest – will reply, “No”, and be chagrined for having been 
made to appear to have contradicted her earlier testimony.
89 Clermont and Sherwin dismiss this objection as an “appealing but unsound lay intuition” that 
conflicts with the supposed basic goal of minimizing erroneous judgments. Clermont/Sherwin, 
AJCL 50 (2002) 252; see id. 258.
90 Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200–01 (6th Cir. 1988); see American Law 
Institute (fn. 78) § 28 cmt. a.
91 American Law Institute (fn. 78) § 28 cmt. a and cmt. a reporters’ note.
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3. Professional Malpractice: Lost Chances
An identical situation exists in many common law and some civil law juris-
dictions in the medical malpractice context. In these jurisdictions, the courts, 
applying the statistical probability interpretation of the standard of persuasion, 
erroneously assume that, if the doctor’s negligence in diagnosing or treating 
an ill patient deprived the patient of a 50+ percent statistical probability of 
avoiding the injury that subsequently occurred (generally, death), then the doc-
tor’s negligent causation of the injury is easily – indeed, certainly – proven; 
however, if the patient was deprived of a less than a 50+ percent statistical 
probability of avoiding the injury, the defendant’s negligent causation of the 
injury is not deemed to be proven (indeed, theoretically it is disproven) and the 
defendant is not liable.92 The same result is reached in German law, through a 
rule shifting the burden of proof of lack of causation to the defendant doctor in 
cases of gross medical negligence that deprived the plaintiff of a 50+ percent 
probability of avoiding the injury.93 Under either approach, proof of actual 
causation (or its lack) and all-or-nothing liability arbitrarily turns on a trivial 
difference in statistical probability.
Some courts, in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, while suppos-
edly adhering to the usual requirement that the plaintiff prove the defendant’s 
tortious causation of the plaintiff’s injury, but influenced by the statistical 
probability interpretation of the standard of persuasion and perhaps by the ar-
bitrary distinction under that standard between trivial differences in statistical 
probability, have been willing to treat any significant increase in risk (or its 
converse, loss of any significant chance of avoiding the injury) as proof of, or 
equivalent to, actual causation of the injury and thus as supporting holding the 
defendant fully liable for the injury.94
Other courts, including many American courts, while treating the defendant’s 
depriving the plaintiff of a 50+ percent chance of avoiding the injury as proof 
of actual causation and consequent full liability, acknowledge that causation is 
not proven when the plaintiff had less than a 50+ percent chance of survival, 
but (supposedly) hold the defendant liable for having caused a newly recog-
nized legal injury, the plaintiff’s “lost chance” of avoiding the tangible injury 
that actually occurred, with liability being imposed for a portion of the tangible 
injury equal to the lost chance.95 The same theory is followed in France wheth-
er the probability is greater or less than 50 percent.96 This approach (except in 
France) continues to base significant, albeit reduced, substantive differences 
in liability on mere trivial differences in statistical probability. Moreover, even 
92 See, e.g., Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l. Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 399–400 (Tex. 1993); American 
Law Institute (fn. 78) § 26 cmt. n (assuming proof of causation, and thus full liability, if “the 
probability of a better outcome was in excess of 50 percent”); van Dam (fn. 2) 295 ff.
93 van Dam (fn. 2) 296.
94 Stella (fn. 64) 1 f. (English translation); Wright, Iowa L Rev 73 (1988) 1067 ff.; supra fn. 25 
(Italian cases).
95 Wright, Iowa L Rev 73 (1988) 1067–72.
96 van Dam (fn. 2) 293 f. The lost chance theory is applied widely in France. Id. In many other 
jurisdictions – especially in the United States – it is applied only in medical malpractice cases.
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in France, it erroneously equates aggregate statistical probabilities of avoiding 
the tangible injury with the particular plaintiff’s probability of avoiding that 
injury in the particular situation, which will vary depending on his particular 
genetic makeup and other relevant conditions, and, while claiming to impose 
liability for having caused the (particular) lost chance, it actually imposes li-
ability not for the lost chance – the mere imposition of unrealized risk – but 
rather for the plaintiff’s actual tangible injury, in the acknowledged absence of 
proof of causation of that tangible injury. No liability is imposed for the lost 
chance in the absence of the physical injury, and the liability that is imposed 
when there is a physical injury (which may or may not have been affected or 
caused by the lost chance) is not for the (statistical) value of the lost chance, 
but rather for the damages resulting from the physical injury, reduced in pro-
portion to the statistical lost chance.
Oddly, in the United Kingdom, the lost chance doctrine is applied with respect 
to financial losses in contractual relationships, including the attorney-client 
relationship, but not in medical malpractice cases.97 The English position is 
even odder when one considers that the usual justification for employing the 
lost chance doctrine or some other second-best liability rule is the inherent 
impossibility of proving causation.98 In legal malpractice cases, the trial that 
did not occur or that was botched can be re-litigated – “a trial within a trial,” 
as occurs in the United States – to determine whether the plaintiff would have 
won or lost; there is no need for a lost chance doctrine. The same is not true in 
medical malpractice cases.
The British House of Lords’ decision in the Hotson medical malpractice case99 
is an especially dramatic example of the perverse results that often are caused 
by the statistical probability interpretation of the standard of persuasion. The 
plaintiff fell from a tree and ruptured some of the blood vessels in his left 
femoral epiphysis. The defendant’s negligent delay in diagnosing and treating 
his injury caused a swelling of the epiphysis that compressed the remaining 
intact blood vessels and thus shut off the supply of blood from those blood 
vessels. As a result of the combined loss of blood from the initial fall and 
ruptures and the subsequent compression of the remaining blood vessels, the 
epiphysis became distorted and deformed, resulting in permanent injury to 
the boy’s left hip and leg. However, the trial court determined that there was 
a 75 percent chance that the permanent injury would have happened anyway 
even if the defendant had not been negligent, due to the loss of blood from the 
ruptured blood vessels. Focusing on this finding, the House of Lords held that 
the defendant was not liable due to lack of causation, which as a past fact is 
determined by the “balance of probabilities” – the British version of the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard of persuasion.100 Adding insult to injury, 
the court further held that there could be no recovery for any lost chance: “In 
97 Id. 294 f.
98 See Wright, Loy LA L Rev 41 (2008) 1295 ff.
99 Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority, [1987] 1 Appeal Cases (A.C.) 750.
100 See Wright, Loy LA L Rev 41 (2008) 1322 f.
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determining what did happen in the past a court decides on the balance of 
probabilities. Anything that is more probable than not it treats as certain.”101 
After using a statistical probability argument to find a lack of causation, the 
court makes the plaintiff’s 25 percent chance of avoiding the injury disappear 
through judicial ipse dixit!
However, that is not the worst part of the court’s decision. The worst part is 
the court’s denial of actual causation, as a result of combining the statistical 
probability interpretation of the standard of persuasion with the but-for test 
of causation. Although the plaintiff most likely would have suffered the per-
manent injury anyway, the defendant’s negligence, by causing the loss of the 
blood supply from the intact blood vessels, contributed to the aggregate loss 
of blood that caused the permanent injury (and likely was a but-for cause of 
this happening earlier than it otherwise would have), just as stabbing a person 
who more likely than not already has been stabbed sufficient times to bleed to 
death, but who still has a significant amount of blood left and several hours to 
live, contributes to that person’s bleeding to death (and likely is a but-for cause 
of the death happening earlier than it otherwise would have).102
4. Res Ipsa Loquitur and “Prima Facie” Presumptions
The last doctrine to be discussed is the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, which seems 
to exist in every jurisdiction even though it sometimes is known by a different 
name (e.g., as the “prima facie” evidence doctrine in Germany).103
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, as usually stated, allows an inference of neg-
ligent causation of the plaintiff’s injury by the defendant if (a) in the type of 
situation that existed the injury ordinarily does not occur unless there is negli-
gence and (b) other possible responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by 
the evidence.104 Although condition (b) may put some limitations on the scope 
of the doctrine, depending on how it is interpreted,105 it constitutes a departure 
from the ordinary substantive liability rules and proof rules of a magnitude that 
is not commonly appreciated. The doctrine allows an inference of negligent 
conduct by the defendant, and a further inference that the inferred negligence 
caused the plaintiff’s injury, based on a mere ex ante statistical frequency. If, in 
the aggregate, most (50+ percent) occurrences of this type of event are caused 
by negligence, then negligent causation by the defendant can be inferred with-
out any specific evidence of negligence or causation by the defendant or any-
one else on the particular occasion.
101 Hotson (fn. 99) 785 (Lord MacKay) (quoting Mallett v. McMonagle, [1970] A.C. 166, 176 
(Lord Diplock)); accord, Hotson, 1 [1987] A.C. at 792 (Lord Ackner).
102 See R. Wright, Acts and Omissions as Positive and Negative Causes, in J.W. Neyers/E. 
Chamberlain/S.G.A. Pitel (eds.), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (2007) 287, 295–97, 299.
103 Murray/Stürner (fn. 4) 312 f.; van Dam (fn. 2) 1107; van Gerven/Lever/Larouche (fn. 2) sec. 
4.2.3 at 428/15 ff.
104 E.g., American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) § 328D(1).
105 See Wright, Loy LA L Rev 41 (2008) 1338 ff. 
72 
73 
74 
104 Richard W. Wright
Thus, contrary to what is commonly stated,106 it is not true that res ipsa loqui-
tur is merely a fancy Latin name, employed in the particular context of prov-
ing the defendant’s causal negligence, for the ordinary use of circumstantial 
evidence to make a straightforward factual inference. Circumstantial evidence 
is concrete evidence specific to the particular occasion about the network of 
instantiated causal relationships leading to and flowing from the particular fac-
tual issue being litigated. For example, a person’s running away from the scene 
of a murder immediately after it happened with blood on her that matches the 
victim’s blood and holding a knife, the blade of which matches the victim’s 
stab wound, is strong circumstantial evidence that she stabbed the victim. The 
inference of negligence allowed by the res ipsa loquitur doctrine as stated by 
many courts, interpreted literally, does not require any such case-specific evi-
dence of what actually happened on the particular occasion, but rather only 
abstract statistical data (or assumptions) on what usually (50+ percent of the 
time) has happened in such situations. The difference in the validity of the 
inference depending on whether or not the word “ordinarily” is included paral-
lels the distinction between the admissibility of habit evidence (allowed) and 
character evidence (generally not allowed) to prove what a person did on a 
particular occasion.107
The common failure to appreciate the extraordinary nature of the res ipsa lo-
quitur doctrine is probably attributable to an assumption that the word “ordi-
narily” in the first condition is simply an incorporation of the preponderance of 
the evidence standard, interpreted as merely requiring a 50+ percent statistical 
probability. Once again, however, taking this interpretation seriously immedi-
ately raises a logical contradiction. Why, if the first condition is satisfied, is the 
inference that someone was negligent only a permissive one, rather than being 
required? Why, in the absence of any contrary evidence by the defendant, al-
low the trier of fact not to draw the inference once the conditions for drawing 
the inference have been established, especially since this permits inconsistent 
verdicts by different juries in similar situations, which is a denial of formal 
justice?
The reason, I suspect, is a discomfort with the broad formulation of the doc-
trine, especially when there is a conscious realization that it permits an infer-
ence of negligence by the defendant based merely on aggregate statistical fre-
quency. Allowing the trier of fact not to draw the inference may be an implicit 
concession that she should be able to draw the inference or not depending 
on whether she actually believes the defendant was causally negligent in the 
particular situation. But if the existence of such an actual belief is the concern, 
the broad formulation should be abandoned in favor of the narrow one (with 
106 E.g., W.L. Prosser/W.P. Keeton/D.B. Dobbs/R.E. Keeton/D.G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on 
Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 39, at 243 f. & fn. 20; American Law Institute (fn. 104) § 328D cmt. a. 
But see D.B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2000) § 154, at 372 (noting, correctly, that res ipsa lo-
quitur cases differ “overwhelmingly” from ordinary circumstantial evidence cases by allowing 
an inference of negligence [and causation] without any particularistic evidence of negligence 
[or causation] on the particular occasion).
107 E.g., K.S. Broun et al. (eds.), McCormick on Evidence (6th ed. 2006) vol. 1 §§ 186, 188, 195.
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the word “ordinarily” omitted), or at least the trier of fact should be instruct-
ed that an inference of negligent causation should be drawn only if evidence 
specific to the particular case combines with the “ordinarily would not hap-
pen” statistical frequency to raise a minimal belief that the defendant actually 
was negligent in the particular situation and that such negligence contributed 
to the plaintiff’s injury. On the other hand, if the broad formulation is meant 
to provide a second-best (or third-best) resolution of the factual uncertainty 
regarding negligent causation, it seems that decision should be consistently 
implemented through a rebuttable presumption.
